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We propose a new signal security system and its VLSI architecture for real-time multimedia data transmission applications. We
first define two bit-circulation functions for one-dimensional binary array transformation. Then, we exploit a chaotic system in
generating a binary sequence to control the bit-circulation functions defined for performing the successive transformation on the
input data. Each eight 8-bit data elements is regarded as a set and is fed into an 8 × 8 binary matrix being transformed on each
row and each column of the matrix by these two bit-circulation functions such that the signal can be transformed into completely
disordered data. The features of the proposed design include low computational complexity, regular operations suitable for low-
cost VLSI implementation, high data security, and high feasibility for easy integration with commercial multimedia storage and
transmission applications. We have performed Matlab simulation to verify the functional correctness of the proposed system. In
implementing the system, a low-cost VLSI architecture has been designed, verified, and physically realized based on a 0.35 µm
CMOS technology. The implementation results show that the proposed signal security system can achieve 117 Mbytes/s data
throughput rate that is fast enough for real-time data protection in multimedia transmission applications.
Keywords and phrases: signal encryption/decryption, VLSI chip, chaotic system, and fractal dimension.
1. INTRODUCTION
Recently, with the great demand in digital signal transmis-
sion[1, 2] and the big losses from illegal data access, data se-
curity has become a critical and imperative issue in the mul-
timedia data transmission applications. In order to protect
valuable data from undesirable readers or against illegal re-
production and modifications, there have been various data
encryption techniques [3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10] and the water-
mark embedding schemes [11, 12, 13] on images proposed
in the literature. The data encryption techniques make the
images invisible to undesirable readers and can be applied to
protect the frames in the digital versatile disk (DVD) and the
cable TV, while the watermark-embedded schemes hide the
watermark onto an image to declare their ownership but the
image is still visible.
Among the existing data encryption techniques [3, 4, 5,
6, 7, 8, 9, 10], we can classify their basic design ideas into
three major types: position permutation [5, 6], value trans-
formation [7, 8], and the combination form [9, 10]. The po-
sition permutation algorithms scramble the original data ac-
cording to some predefined schemes. It is simple but usually
has low data security. The value transformation algorithms
transform the data value of the original signal with some
kinds of transformation. It has the potential of low computa-
tional complexity and low hardware cost. Finally, the combi-
nation form performs both position permutation and value
transformation. It has the potential of high data security.












































Figure 1: The block diagram of the proposed signal security system applied to a still image encryption/decryption.
In this paper, we propose a new signal security sys-
tem and its VLSI architecture for real-time multimedia data
transmission applications. The proposed encryption algo-
rithm belongs to the category of the combination form
mentioned above. We first define two bit-circulation func-
tions with two parameters in each function. One is used
to control the shift direction and the other is used to con-
trol the shifted bit-number on the data transformation.
Then, we exploit a chaotic system in generating a binary
sequence to control the bit-circulation functions for per-
forming the successive data transformation on the input
data. Eight 8-bit data elements are regarded as a set and
fed into an 8 × 8 binary matrix. In the successive trans-
formation on each row and each column by using these
two functions, we randomly determine the two parameters
used in the functions according to the generated chaotic
binary sequence such that the signal can be transformed
into completely disorderly data. In demonstrating the cor-
rect functionality of the proposed signal security system,
we have performed the Matlab simulation on the proposed
scheme. In implementing the proposed system, we present
a low-cost VLSI architecture that has been designed, veri-
fied, and physically realized by using Verilog hardware de-
scription language (HDL), Synopsys logic synthesis tool de-
sign compiler (DC), and Avanti layout tools (Apollo) based
on a 0.35 µmCMOS technology. The implementation results
show that the proposed signal security system can achieve
117 Mbytes/s data throughput rate at the cost of silicon area
of 3.59mm2. This data-processing rate is fast enough for real-
time data protection in multimedia data transmission appli-
cations.
The proposed signal security system is suitable for both
software and hardware implementation depending on the re-
quirement of applications. In the multimedia applications
realized in software or DSP firmware, it is suggested to re-
alize the proposed system through general-purpose proces-
sors or DSP processors. On the other hand, it is suggested to
use the proposed hardware design in the multimedia appli-
cations realized in hardware like ASICs or SOCs. In this sit-
uation, the system integrators can use the proposed encryp-
tion/decryption design as an independent module or intel-
lectual properties (IP) that can be cooperated with the exist-
ing multimedia ASICs or SOCs to perform the functionality
of real-time data encryption and decryption.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2,
we propose the new signal security system including algo-
rithm derivation and illustration as well as the analysis on
complexity and security. In Section 3, we perform the soft-
ware simulation, randomness measurement, and sensitivity
analysis of parameters in the proposed system. In Section 4,
we illustrate the hardware design and realization of the pro-
posed system. In Section 5, we evaluate the performance
evaluation of the proposed design and compare it with the
existing designs. Finally, we conclude this paper in Section 6.
2. THE PROPOSED NEW SIGNAL SECURITY SYSTEM
2.1. Notations and definitions
Let g denote a one-dimensional (1D) digital signal of length
N , g(n), 0 ≤ n ≤ N − 1, be the one-byte value of the signal g
at n,M an 8×8 binary matrix, and g′ andM′ the encryption
results of g and M, respectively. In the following definitions,
the integer parameters r and s are assumed to be larger than
or equal to 0, but they are less than 8.
Definition 1. The mapping RotateX
p,r
i : M → M′ is defined
to rotate each bit in the ith row ofM, 0 ≤ i ≤ 7, r bits in the
left direction if p equals 1 or r bits in the right direction if p
equals 0.
Definition 2. The mapping RotateY
q,s
j : M → M′ is defined
to rotate each bit in the jth column ofM, 0 ≤ j ≤ 7, s bits in
the up direction if q equals 1 or s bits in the down direction
if q equals 0.





1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1
1 1 0 0 1 0 1 1
1 0 1 0 0 1 1 1
1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1
0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0
1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1
0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0








1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1
1 1 0 0 1 0 1 1
1 0 1 0 0 1 1 1
1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1
0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0
1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1
0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0




RotateY 1,33 (M) =


1 0 0 1 0 1 1 1
1 1 0 0 1 0 1 1
1 0 1 0 0 1 1 1
1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1
0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0
1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1
0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0




RotateY 0,25 ·RotateX1,22 (M) =


1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
1 1 0 0 1 0 1 1
1 0 0 1 1 1 1 0
1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1
0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0
1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1
0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0














i ) possesses the
following three desirable features:
(1) a binary matrix M can be transformed into quite dif-
ferent matrixes;
(2) diﬀerent matrixes can be transformed into the same
matrix;
(3) given a transformation pair of M and M′, the combi-
nation of p, q, r, and s resulting in the transformation
pair may be nonunique.
Since M is an 8 × 8 matrix, the result of circulating its
row or column k bits is equal to the result of circulating it
(kmod8) bits in the same direction. This is why r and s are
assumed to be in the ranges of 0 ≤ r ≤ 7 and 0 ≤ s ≤ 7.
2.2. The new signal security system
Based on the notations and definitions, the encryption
procedure denoted as the two-dimensional (2D) circula-
tion encryption algorithm (TDCEA) on g is proposed in
Algorithm 1.
Each eight 8-bit data elements are regarded as a process-
ing group and fed into the 8 × 8 binary matrix M. Each
row of M is transformed by RotateX
p,r
i , and then each col-
umn of the resulting matrix is transformed by RotateY
q,s
j . In
each row or column transformation, the mapping parame-
ters p, r, q, and s are randomly determined by the chaotic
binary sequence in (3), (4), (6), and (7). The row transfor-
mation belongs to the type of value transformation and the
column transformation makes the position permutation in
each bit-plane. Hence, the TDCEA belongs to the type of
combination-form category in the existing data encryption
schemes.
The decryption procedure is very similar to Algorithm 1
except for the following two modifications.
(1) The j-loop including the assignment of q and s and the
mapping RotateY
q,s
j is changed to be ahead of the i-




(2) The parameter q in RotateY
q,s
j changes to its com-
plement INV(q) and the parameter p in RotateX
p,r
i
changes to its complement INV(p), where INV(x) de-
notes the logically inverting operation on the vari-
able x, that is, the mapping function applied to M′ in










Combining the encryption subsystem and decryption
subsystem, the block diagram of the proposed signal secu-
rity system is shown in Figure 1. By extracting 17 bits from
each evolution state of the logistic map, we generate a binary
sequence. The reason why we adopt 17 bits depends on the
amount of control signals needed in each cycle when apply-
ing the proposed TDCEA.









i ) according to (3), (4),
(6), and (7) in Algorithm 1. That is, the rotation direction
and the shifted bit-number in the mapping are randomly
controlled by the sequence. Finally, each eight pixels are suc-
cessively mapped and the completely chaotic results can be
obtained. In the decryption phase, according to the same
µ and x(0), that is, the same chaotic binary sequence, the









j ) to the encrypted im-
age. The variables µ and x(0) used in the proposed algorithm
can be protected and transmitted from transmitters to re-
ceivers using the method illustrated in Section 2.3.
2.3. Generation, protection, and transmission
of the parameters α, β, µ, and x(0)
In the proposed design, we need four parameters α, β, µ, and
x(0) in generating the chaotic bit-stream from the 1D logistic
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Step 1: Determine the parameters N , α, and β, where 0 < α + β < 8, α ∈ N, and
β ∈ (N∪ {0}), where N denotes the set of positive integers.
Step 2: Determine the parameter µ and the initial point x(0) of the 1D logistic map
fµ(x) = µx(1− x). Evolve successive states from the 1D logistic map [14, 15] by
x(n + 1) = µx(n)(1− x(n)), and the preceding 17 bits below the decimal point
of the binary representation of x(n), n = 1, 2, . . . , are extracted to constitute the
chaotic binary sequence b(0), b(1), b(2), . . . , and so forth.
Step 3: For k = 0 to (N/8− 1) Do
For x = 0 to 7 Do
Let g(8k + x) =∑7y=0 dy × 2y ;
For y = 0 to 7
M(x, y) = dy ;
End
End
For i = 0 to 7 Do
p = b(17k + i), (3)
r = α + β × b(17k + i + 1), (4)
M = RotateXp,ri (M); (5)
End
For j = 0 to 7 Do
q = b(17k + 8 + j), (6)
s = α + β× b(17k + 9 + j), (7)
M = RotateYq,sj (M); (8)
End
For x = 0 to 7 Do
g′(8k + x) =
7∑
y=0
M(x, y)× 2y ; (9)
End
End
Step 4: The encryption result g′ is obtained and the algorithm is terminated.
Algorithm 1: The two-dimensional circulation encryption algorithm (TDCEA).
map. The four parameters could be viewed as the keys to the
proposed signal security system. Among them, the parame-
ters α and β can be fixed in both the transmitter and receiver
according to the constraint shown in Step 1 of the proposed
TDCEA. In providing higher security of the proposed TD-
CEA, we can try to vary the parameters of µ and x(0) during
the transmission of multimedia data frequently. Let µb and
Xb denote the built-in keys of µ and x(0), respectively, in the
proposed signal security system. Let µenc,0 and Xenc,0 denote
the initial encrypting keys of µ and x(0), respectively, dur-
ing the transmission from the transmitter to the receiver. The
way of generating, protecting, and transmitting the parame-
ters of µ and x(0) is shown in the following procedures.
(1) We first select the initial values of µ0 and x(0)0 follow-
ing the constraints of 3 < µ0 < 4 and 0 < x(0)0 < 1.
(2) Then, we encrypt the initial µ0 and x(0)0 by the follow-
ing way:
Xenc,0 = x(0)0 ⊕ Xb,
µenc,0 = µ0 ⊕ µb. (10)
(3) Transmitting the encrypted µenc and Xenc from the
transmitter to the receiver for reproducing the initial
µ0 and x(0)0 by the following way:
x(0)0 = Xenc,0 ⊕ Xb,
µ0 = µenc,0 ⊕ µb. (11)
(4) In the pth updating of the parameters µ and x(0), that
is, µp and x(0)p, we can use the values of µp−1 and
x(0)p−1 in the (p − 1)th updating to replace the roles
of the built-in parameters of µb and Xb. Then, we can
use the way specified in (10) and (11) in protecting the
successive updated parameters of µ and x(0) as follows:
Xenc,p = x(0)p ⊕ x(0)p−1,
µenc,p = µp ⊕ µp−1,
x(0)p = Xenc,p ⊕ x(0)p−1,
µp = µenc,p ⊕ µp−1.
(12)
(5) The updating period of the parameters of µ and x(0)
could be based on the basic unit of video frame or au-
dio frame in representing the multimedia data.
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Table 1: The complexity of the proposed TDCEA on a signal of length N .




Equation (3) of Step 3 N N 0 0
Equation (4) of Step 3 N 2N N 0
Equation (5) of Step 3 0 0 0 N
Equation (6) of Step 3 N N 0 0
Equation (7) of Step 3 N 2N N 0
Equation (8) of Step 3 0 0 0 N
Total 4N + 2	N/8
 6N + 	N/8
 2N 2N
2.4. Chaos via 1D logistic map
A simple and well-studied example of a 1D map [14] that
exhibits complicated behavior is the logistic map from the
interval [0, 1] into [0, 1], parameterized by µ:
gµ(x) = µx(1− x), (13)
where 0 ≤ µ ≤ 4. This map constitutes a discrete-time dy-
namical system in the sense that the map gµ : [0, 1] → [0, 1]
generates a semigroup through the operation of composi-
tion of functions. The state evolution is described by xn+1 =
gµ(xn). We denote
g(n) ≡ g ◦ g ◦ · · · ◦ g (n times). (14)
For all x ∈ [0, 1], a “discrete-time” trajectory {xi}∞i=0, where
xi = g(i)(x), can be generated. The set of points {x0, x1, . . .} ⊂
[0, 1] is called the (forward) orbit of x. A periodic point of g
is a point x ∈ [0, 1] such that x = g(n)(x) for some positive
integer n. The least positive integer n is called the period of
x. A periodic point of period 1 is called a fixed point. For















)∣∣∣∣∣ > 1, (16)
where xi = g(i)(x).
In the logistic map, as µ is varied from 0 to 4, a period-
doubling bifurcation occurs. In the region µ ∈ [0, 3], the
map gµ possesses one stable fixed point. As µ is increased past
3, the stable fixed point becomes unstable and two new sta-
ble periodic points of period 2 are created. As µ is further
increased, these stable periodic points in turn become unsta-
ble and each spawns two new stable periodic points of period
4. Thus the period of the stable periodic points is doubled at
each bifurcation point. Each period-doubling episode occurs
in a shorter “parameter” interval, decreasing at a geometric
rate each time. Moreover, at a finite µ, the period-doubling
Bifurcation parameter µ













Figure 2: Bifurcation diagram of the logistic map gµ(x) = µx(1−x).
episode converges to an infinite number of period doublings
at which point chaos is observed. This is depicted in the bi-
furcation diagram in Figure 2.
2.5. Analysis of computational complexity
If the TDCEA is simulated by using C language, just the





j . In Step 2, it requires
one subtraction and two multiplications to evolve a state
from the 1D logistic map, and the total evolution number is
	N/8
, where 	y
 denotes the largest integer that is smaller
than or equal to y. In (4) and (7), since b(n) is either 1
or 0, the equations can be performed by one condition test
and two additions instead. The computational complexity
of the proposed TDCEA on a signal of length N is listed in
Table 1. From Table 1, the numbers of multiplications, addi-
tions/subtractions, condition tests, and circular shiftings are
4N + 2	N/8
, 6N + 	N/8
, 2N , and 2N , respectively. Hence,
the computational complexity of the TDCEA is proportional
to O(N).
2.6. Analysis of security problem
It is of interests to know if the TDCEA is easily decrypted or
not. This security problem is analyzed in the following.
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Proposition 1. For an unknown set of µ and x(0) of the logistic
map, the number of possible encryption results is 217N/8 if the
TDCEA is applied to a signal of length N .
Proof. Since it requires 17N/8 bits to encrypt a signal of
length N , the number of possible encryption results is
217N/8.
For example, consider an image of size 256 × 256 pix-
els. In this case, N equals 65536. All the possibilities are
2139264(∼= 1041918). Since the chaotic binary sequence is un-
predictable [16], it is very diﬃcult to decrypt correctly an
encrypted signal by making an exhaustive search without
knowing µ and x(0). Moreover, small fluctuation in µ and
x(0) results in quite diﬀerent chaotic binary sequence be-
cause the trajectory of the chaotic system is very sensitive
to initial condition [16]. By way of collecting some original
signals and their encryption results or collecting some spec-
ified signals and their corresponding encryption results, it is
impossible for the cryptanalysts to decrypt correctly an en-
crypted image without knowing µ and x(0) because the rota-
tion direction and the shifted bit-number in each row or col-
umn transformation is randomly determined by the chaotic
binary sequence. Hence, the new scheme can resist the cho-
sen ciphertext attack and the known plaintext attack [17].
3. SIMULATION RESULTS
3.1. Software simulation and the calculation
of fractal dimension
In the simulation, ten images of size 256 × 256 are used. As
representatives, only the images of “cman,” “aero,” and “pep-
per” are shown in Figures 3a, 3d, and 3g, respectively. The
most direct method to decide the disorderly degree of the en-
crypted image is by the sense of sight. On the other hand, the
fractal dimension [18, 19] can provide the quantitative mea-
sure on the randomness of the encrypted images. General
images typically have a degree of randomness associated with
both the natural random nature of the underlying structure
and the random noise superimposed on the image. An image
f of size L×P pixels is regarded as a surface with z = f (x, y)
inR3. To measure how rough the encrypted image surface is,
its fractal dimension D is calculated according to the method
in [19].
Let ndi(k) be the average of absolute intensity diﬀerence
of all pixel pairs with distance values whose integer parts are















where npn(k) is the total number of pixel pairs with distance




(x2− x1)2 + (y2− y1)2 < k + 1. (18)
Plot all pairs (log(k), log(ndi(k))), and then use a least-
squares linear regression to estimate the slopeH of the resul-
tant curve. The fractal dimensionD = 3−H can be obtained.
In the simulation, the maximal distance k between two pixels
in (17) is set to 60.
In order to apply the TDCEA, the parameters α and β
must be determined according to Step 1. Basically, the selec-
tion of α and β should follow the empirical law. According to
the experimental experience, general combinations of α and
β can always result in very disorderly results. In the simula-
tion, α = 2 and β = 2 are adopted in Step 1. In the logistic
map, x(0) = 0.75 and µ = 3.9 are set in Step 2. The encrypted
results of the three representative images by the TDCEA are
shown in Figures 3b, 3e, and 3h.Moreover, the fractal dimen-
sions of the original images and their encryption results are
calculated and listed in Table 2.
According to Figure 3, the encryption results of the TD-
CEA are of complete disorder and cannot be distinguished
from the original ones. Moreover, from the quantitative mea-
sure results shown in Table 2, the fractal dimensions of the
encrypted images range from 2.9974 to 2.9830. Since the
maximal fractal dimension for a 2D surface is 3.00, the en-
cryption results of the TDCEA are completely disordered.
Figures 3c, 3f, and 3i, respectively, show the decrypted images
of “cman,” “aero,” and “pepper.” Since the proposed TDCEA
is not losable, we can find that there would be no encryp-
tion/decryption errors in using the proposed TDCEA.
3.2. Analysis of parameter sensitivity
In order to demonstrate that the encryption results of the
TDCEA are very sensitive to µ and x(0), tiny fluctuation in
the two parameters is considered. To compare the encryp-
tion results with small parameter fluctuation, the root mean
square diﬀerence (RMSD) is computed. Let f ′µ1 ,x1(0) be the en-
cryption result of the image f under µ1 and x1(0) and let
f ′µ2 ,x2(0) be the one under µ2 and x2(0); the RMSD between
f ′µ1 ,x1(0) and f
′















where f is an image of size L × P pixels. Firstly, x(0) is fixed
to be 0.75 and tiny fluctuation of 10−5 in µ is considered.
The RMSD comparison result of “Lena” is listed in Table 3.
Secondly, µ is fixed to be 3.9 and tiny fluctuation of 10−5 in
x(0) is considered. The RMSD between each fluctuation is
listed in Table 4. From Tables 3 and 4, the RMSDs range from
91.1739 to 92.6910. The average gray-level diﬀerence of each
pixel between the two encryption results with tiny fluctua-
tion in µ or x(0) is about 92. It implies that the two results
are extraordinarily diﬀerent. Hence, the encryption result of
the TDCEA is very sensitive to the fluctuation in µ and x(0).
4. ARCHITECTURE DESIGN AND REALIZATION
Figure 4a shows the architecture of the proposed new signal
security system. It includes one signal encryption unit (SEU),




Figure 3: (a) Original “Cman,” (b) encrypted “Cman,” (c) decrypted “Cman,” (d) original “Aero,” (e) encrypted “Aero,” (f) decrypted “Aero,”
(g) original “Pepper,” (h) encrypted “Pepper,” and (i) decrypted “Pepper.”
Table 2: The fractal dimensions of the original and encrypted images.
Cman Einstein Mill Lena Aero Baboon Pepper Boat Boys Karen
Original Image 2.5671 2.6702 2.8087 2.5993 2.7427 2.7178 2.6407 2.7885 2.4878 2.5932
Encrypted Image 2.9830 2.9937 2.9957 2.9924 2.9957 2.9974 2.9947 2.9894 2.9906 2.9901
Table 3: The RMSD between the encryption results with x(0) = 0.75 and tiny fluctuation of 10−5 in µ.
3.9000 3.90001 3.90002 3.90003 3.90004 3.90005 3.90006 3.90007 3.90008
µ vs. vs. vs. vs. vs. vs. vs. vs. vs.
3.90001 3.90002 3.90003 3.90004 3.90005 3.90006 3.90007 3.90008 3.90009
RMSD 91.7405 91.7855 92.0908 91.7223 92.4095 92.0035 92.0625 92.1774 91.9920
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Table 4: The RMSD between the encryption results with µ = 3.9 and tiny fluctuation of 10−5 in x(0).
0.75000 0.75001 0.75002 0.75003 0.75004 0.75005 0.75006 0.75007 0.75008
x(0) vs. vs. vs. vs. vs. vs. vs. vs. vs.
0.75001 0.75002 0.75003 0.75004 0.75005 0.75006 0.75007 0.75008 0.75009
RMSD 92.0361 92.0357 92.2701 92.5990 92.6580 92.1739 91.8318 92.4014 92.6910
one signal decryption unit (SDU), and two chaotic binary se-
quence generators (CBSGs). From the proposed algorithm,
we find that the SDU operation is very similar to the SEU op-
eration except that the directions of the left/right shifting on
the row data and the up/down shifting on the column data
are opposite. So, with opposite control signals in the shift-
ing directions, the same SEU architecture can be used in the
SDU. Thus, we design an encryption/decryption core for the
proposed system as shown in Figure 4b. Figure 5 shows the
architecture of the SEU/SDU in the encryption/decryption
core. In the SEU/SDU design, we adopt the 2D array of
processing elements (PEs) as shown in Figure 6 to perform
the signal encryption/decryption operation on eight pixels
simultaneously in bit level. That is, each PE has been de-
signed to perform the following functions including loading,
left/right shifting, and up/down shifting under the control of
the parameters p, q, r, and s, derived from the chaotic binary
sequence b(·) that is obtained from the CBSG as shown in
Figure 7. As shown in Figure 6, the PE in the proposed design
is composed of the data multiplexing circuit and D-type flip-
flop (DFF). Using data multiplexing circuit is to achieve the
loading/outputting, left/right (L/R) rotation, and up/down
(U/D) rotation using the same DFF. Since the shifting oper-
ations with variant numbers of bits are needed in the pro-
posed design, we use DFF with configurable input sources to
achieve this goal in multiple clock cycles instead of disabling
the clock signal to the DFF. For each left/right shifting on the
row data, it takes 8 cycles to finish the operations in the worst
case. Similarly, it also takes 8 cycles to finish the up/down
shifting operations for the column data in the worst case. In-
cluding the initial 8 cycles needed to feed the input data into
the 2D array of PEs, it totally takes 24 cycles to finish the sig-
nal encryption operation for each 8 input pixels. For balanc-
ing the I/O data processing rates, we use three data security
block (DSB) modules in the SEU/SDU design such that we
can achieve the data throughput rate of 1 pixel/cycle. This
arrangement results in the pipeline operations on the DSB
modules in the SEU/SDU.
Table 5 shows the scheduling of the DSB operations in
the proposed design under pipelining and nonpipelining or-
ganization. In the pipelining organization (as the proposed
design in Figure 5), we see that three DSBs perform the op-
erations of loading/outputting, L/R rotation, and U/D ro-
tation repeatedly so that the data throughput rate is equal
to 1 Byte/cycle. The maximum throughput rate amounts to
117 Mbyte/s with the cycle time of 8.55 nanoseconds. On the
other hand, if we only use one DSB instead of three in the
SEU/SDU design, it is said to be in the nonpipelining orga-
nization. In this case, we can trade oﬀ the hardware cost and
the data throughput rate by removing two DSBs and lower-
ing down the data throughput rate to 39 Mbyte/s in maxi-
mum. It leaves a freedom for users to select the pipelining or
nonpipelining organizations when using the proposed design
in diﬀerent multimedia applications.
Besides, as we show in Figure 6, the control of the PEs is
accomplished through the ctrl[4 : 0] signal. The ctrl[4 : 0]
signal is composed of five control lines used in the PEs. For
illustrating how to control the operations of PEs through
ctrl[4 : 0], we also show an example of assigning ctrl[4 : 0]
in Figure 6 when the PEs are operated in diﬀerent operation
modes like loading/outputting, L/R rotation, and U/D ro-
tation. In case that the data is loaded into the 2D array in
DSB, it is loaded through the ports, Ext in and out, directly
without using the four bidirectional data ports Li, Ri, Ui, and
Di. When the L/R rotation and U/D rotation operations are
performed, the data is shifted through the four bidirectional
ports under the control of ctrl[4 : 0] as illustrated in Figure 6.
Figure 7 shows the architecture of the CBSG for the 1D
logistic map. The parameters of x(0) and µ are downloaded
into the registers resided in the CBSG sequentially. Then, the
CBSG performs the state evolution according to the behav-
ior of the adopted 1D logistic map shown in (10). In or-
der to minimize the hardware cost, only one multiplier is
used for the state evolution. Each new state x(n + 1) is com-
puted serially in two cycles according to the control signal
shown in Table 6. At odd cycles, µ and x(n) are multiplied.
At even cycles, µx(n) and (1 − x(n)) are multiplied. That is,
the CBSG generates 17 bits in the chaotic binary sequence ev-
ery two cycles. Since the computation time for generating the
chaotic binary sequence is much longer than that needed in
the PEs, we use the design concept of multiple clock sources
in the proposed design. That means we use a slower clock
source in the CBSG design by dividing the original clock
source by a factor. The value of the dividing factor should
be determined by considering the consumption time of the
PEs, multiplier in the CBSG, as well as the data consump-
tion rate of the chaotic binary sequence. Besides, we also have
to consider the complexity of the clock-dividing circuits and
the synchronization between the two clocks. Table 7 shows
the timing information and the control data consumption
rate of the SEU/SDU and CBSGs in the proposed design.
According to the results shown in Table 7, we find that the
minimum consumption time per cycle in the SEU/SDU is
about 8.55 nanoseconds and that the SEU/SDU consumes
17 bits of the control signals within 68.4 nanoseconds (in
8 cycles). Besides, we find that the minimum consumption

















































Figure 4: The architecture of the proposed signal security system.
per cycle in the CBSG is about 14.5 nanoseconds and that
the CBSG generates 17 bits of the control signals within 29
nanoseconds (in 2 cycles for saving the hardware cost as
we describe in Figure 7). Since the CBSG only uses 2 cy-
cles to generate 17 bits of the control signals that are con-
sumed by the SEU/SDU in 8 cycles, the operating frequency
of CBSG could be only 1/4 of that used in the SEU/SDU.
Therefore, we select the dividing factor to be 4 in dividing
the clock of SEU/SDU before sending it to the CBSG. In
this case, even if the operating frequency of the SEU/SDU
achieves the maximum allowable 117MHz, the operating
frequency of that used in the CBSG should be 29.25MHz
in maximum. Using this operating frequency in the CBSG
will not have timing problems since we have 34.2 nanosec-
onds that is larger than the minimum time interval (i.e., 29
nanoseconds) to generate the 17 bits of the control signals by
CBSG.
Figure 8 shows the clock-dividing circuit and the as-
sociated gate-level simulation results to illustrate the phe-
nomenon of clock skew. From the gate-level simulation
shown in Figure 8, we find that the clock skew period be-
tween the two clock sources used in SEU/SDU and CBSGs is
about 1.14 nanosecond. Similar results are also found by ex-
amining the post-layout simulation. We have considered the
problem of clock skew in deciding the clock dividing factor.
Therefore, we can conclude that the clock skew problem of
the two clock sources used in SEU/SDU and CBSGs does not
have synchronization problems influencing the timing per-
formance of the proposed design.
To verify the architecture of the proposed signal secu-
rity system, we perform register transfer level (RTL) mod-
eling of the proposed architecture by using Verilog HDL.
In addition, we have performed the logic synthesis and the
critical path analysis on the proposed architecture by us-
ing Synopsys logic synthesis tool DC based on a 0.35 µm
CMOS technology. Finally, we have implemented the pro-
posed signal security system created by Avanti layout tools
(Apollo). Table 8 shows the physical implementation results
of the proposed signal security system. We found that the
critical path of the proposed design is about 8.55 nanosec-
onds that achieves 117MHz data throughput rate. This pro-
cessing speed can support up to 117 Mbytes/s in data en-
crypting and decrypting, which is fast enough to meet the
real-time processing requirements of many digital image and
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Figure 5: The architecture of the SEU/SDU in the proposed signal security system design.
video applications. Figure 9 shows the layout view according
to a 0.35 µm CMOS technology. The chip area of the pro-
posed system is 3584443.28µm2.
5. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION AND COMPARISONS
This section provides the performance evaluation of the pro-
posed design with other existing designs [20, 21, 22, 23, 24,
25]. In order to eliminate the factor of diﬀerent fabrication
technologies, we define an index of normalized area (denoted
by NArea), which is the silicon area normalized to a 0.35 µm




Besides, we also define an index of data rate per area (DRPA),
that is, Data rate/NArea, as shown in (21), to reflect the ef-
ficiency of the hardware design for data encrypter and de-
crypter. It is shown as follows:
DRPA = Data− rate
NArea
Mbps/mm2. (21)
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ctrl[4 : 0] code assignment
Operations ctrl[4 : 0]
Loading/outputing 00010
L/R rotation
0p101 in the first r cycles
0p100 in the remaining cycles
U/D rotation
q0001 in the first s cycles
q0000 in the remaining cycles
Figure 6: The architecture of the PEs used in the DSB in the proposed SEU/SDU.
Based on the above two indices, we have summarized the
comparison results of the proposed design with the exist-
ing ones [20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25] in Table 9. From Table 9,
we find that the proposed design is better than the design
in [20] in providing higher data processing rate at lower
hardware cost weighted using gate count based on a 0.35 µm
CMOS technology. Also, the proposed design achieves higher
data-processing rate at lower hardware cost in gate count as
compared with the design in [25]. As for the comparison
to the other popular data encryption/decryption approaches
[21, 22, 23, 24, 25], we use the normalized index of DRPA
defined in (21) in the evaluation of the eﬃciency in these
approaches. We find that the proposed design is better than
the existing designs in [21, 22, 23, 24] in possessing higher
DRPA. That means that the proposed design can provide
higher eﬃciency considering the data processing rate and re-
quired hardware cost. Though the above comparison cannot
provide the absolute comparison in every aspect (including
1302 EURASIP Journal on Applied Signal Processing
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Figure 7: The architecture of the CBSG used in the proposed signal security system.
Table 5: The scheduling of DSB operations in the proposed design, where Dn denotes the nth set (with 8 bytes in a set) of data.
(a) Pipelining organization (using three DSBs as proposed in Figure 5).
DSB modules
Cycle DSB1 DSB2 DSB3 Data output
0 ∼ 7 Load D1 — — —
8 ∼ 15 L/R rotation on D1 Load D2 — —
16 ∼ 23 U/D rotation on D1 L/R rotation on D2 Load D3 —
24 ∼ 31 Load D4/output D1 U/D rotation on D2 L/R rotation on D3 D1
32 ∼ 39 L/R rotation on D4 Load D5/output D2 U/D rotation on D3 D2
40 ∼ 47 U/D rotation on D4 L/R rotation on D5 Load D6/output D3 D3
48 ∼ 55 Load D7/output D4 U/D rotation on D5 L/R rotation on D6 D4
56 ∼ 63 L/R rotation on D7 Load D8/output D5 U/D rotation on D6 D5
64 ∼ 71 U/D rotation on D7 L/R rotation on D8 Load D9/output D6 D6
72 ∼ 79 — U/D rotation on D8 L/R rotation on D9 D7
80 ∼ 87 — — U/D rotation on D9 D8
(b) Nonpipelining organization (using only one DSB).
DSB modules
Cycle DSB Data output
0 ∼ 7 Load D1 —
8 ∼ 15 L/R rotation on D1 —
16 ∼ 23 U/D rotation on D1 —
24 ∼ 31 Load D2/output D1 D1
32 ∼ 39 L/R rotation on D2 —
40 ∼ 47 U/D rotation on D2 —
48 ∼ 55 Load D3/output D2 D2
56 ∼ 63 L/R rotation on D3 —
64 ∼ 71 U/D rotation on D3 —
72 ∼ 79 Load D4/output D3 D3
80 ∼ 87 — —
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Table 6: The assignments of the control signals C1 and C2 in the CBSG.
Time 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 · · ·
C1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 · · ·
C2 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 · · ·
Output — CB[16 : 0] — CB[16 : 0] — CB[16 : 0] — CB[16 : 0] — CB[16 : 0] · · ·
Table 7: The timing information and the consumption rate of the control signals in the SEU/SDU and CBSGs.
Minimum consumption time
with clock skew per cycle (ns)
Consumption/generation







SEU/SDU 8.55 17 bits/68.4 ns (in 8 cycles) 4 (= 8 cycles/2 cycles) 117 Yes




(a) Clock dividing circuit optimized by Synopsys design
compiler.
(b) Gate-level simulation regarding clock skew (clock skew is
about 1.14 nanosecond).
Figure 8: Clock dividing circuit and the associated gate-level
simulation results regarding clocks (CLKSEU/SDU = old clk and
CLKCBSG = new clk) in the proposed design.
the eﬃciency as well as other factors like security and so on)
between the proposed design and others, it can reflect the
eﬃciency of the proposed design under the situation that
the security of the proposed design and the existing ones
[20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25] is good enough for the applications.
When the proposed TDCEA design is applied to the data
protection in the multimedia data transmission, we may face
a problem that the encrypted data is lost or corrupted by
noise. In the proposed design, it uses 8-byte data as a unit
Table 8: The details of the physical implementation on the pro-
posed signal security system.
Item Result
Technology COMPASS 0.35 µm CMOS
Power supply 3.3V
Area in gate count 12721 gates




in the encrypting or decrypting processes. Diﬀerent units of
8-byte data are encrypted or decrypted independently except
for using the neighboring bit-stream data as the control sig-
nals. If there is any loss or data corruption in the encrypted
data when transmitted in the network, it would cause data
errors in the around 8-byte data that contains the lost one.
And the error will not propagate if we also flush the associ-
ated control signals with the corrupted data. Since the pro-
posed design is targeted at the applications of multimedia
data transmission, the errors caused by the interference from
network could be recovered by exploiting the well-developed
multimedia error concealment approaches proposed in the
literature.
6. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have proposed a new signal security system
with its VLSI architecture designed, verified, and physically
realized by using Verilog HDL and Synopsys logic synthe-
sis tool (Design Compiler), and Avanti layout tools (Apollo)
based on a 0.35 µm CMOS technology. The features of the
proposed signal security system includeO(N) computational
complexity, high security, and low hardware cost. The simu-
lation results have indicated that (1) the encryption results
are completely chaotic by the sense of sight or by the high
fractal dimension, and (2) the encryption results are very
sensitive to the parameter fluctuation. In addition, we have
implemented the proposed design in silicon that possesses
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Figure 9: The layout view of the proposed signal security system implemented using 0.35 µm CMOS technology.


















Design [20] 0.35 — 55345 395 — — FEA-M 64
Design [21] 0.7 29 — 251.8 7.25 34.73 SAFER K-128 64
Design [22] 0.35 13.69 51400 600 13.69 43.82 AES 128
Design [23] 1.2 107.8 — 177.8 9.17 19.39 IDEA 64
Design [24] 0.8 11.7 — 355 2.24 158.53 IDEA 64
Design [25] 0.25 — 31957 609 — — AES 128
Proposed 0.35 3.59 12721 856 3.59 238.44 TDCEA 64
the data processing rate up to 117 Mbytes/s at the cost of sil-
icon area of 3.59mm2. The comparison results of the pro-
posed design with other existing designs show that the pro-
posed design possesses better performance in terms of the
evaluation index of DRPA, which shows the eﬃciency of the
proposed design. Finally, it is believed that many real-time
digital signal processing systems can benefit from the inte-
gration with the proposed signal security system for provid-
ing high data security in data storage and transmission.
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